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Japan can compete if it  chooses to compete by moving “beyond just
quality competition to competing on strategy and innovation”, according
to Porter et al. (p. 189). What is, of course, implicit in this statement is that
change is needed in Japan, and it will not take place automatically. The
authors in essence argue that Japanese companies should learn to develop
distinctive strategies, and if mindsets change toward a new approach to
competition, Japan has the capacity to move rapidly again. 
To be able to outline the key parameters of a ‘new Japanese model’,
which is  considered inevitable  to  revitalize the Japanese economy, the
authors start with an analysis of Japan’s postwar economic development in
Chapter  1. Their  central  argument is  that,  in contrast  to what  is often
assumed, Japan’s problems are rooted in microeconomics, in “how the
nation competes industry by industry” (p. 2). The emphasis on industries
and firms in explaining competitiveness, when considered together with
the provocative title  Can Japan  Compete?,  invites a discussion of the
national competitiveness  debate. It  is  useful here to remember that the
debate  had  largely  intensified  following  the  publication  of  Krugman’s
(1994a)  article  “Competitiveness:  A  Dangerous  Obsession”1.  Krugman
had  severely  criticized  the  proponents  of  national  competitiveness  by
stating that competitiveness is only meaningful at the firm and industry
level, and when applied to a nation, competitiveness is nothing more than
‘a  fancy  way  of  saying  productivity’.  Although  the  title  Can  Japan
Compete? seems to suggest otherwise, Porter et al.’s approach is, in fact,
in the same line as Porter’s  1990 book  The Competitive  Advantage of
Nations,  where he argued that we must abandon the whole notion of a
‘competitive nation’ since no nation is competitive in everything. Nations,
instead, are relatively more competitive in certain groups of industries but
not in all. Then, to understand the competitive structure and potential of a
nation  in  full,  one  should  focus  on  industries  and  firms  and  the
characteristics of the micro-economic business environment, which shapes
the context that allows firms to gain and sustain competitive advantage.   
1  The  debate  can  be best  followed from the  writings  of  Krugman (1994a  and
1994b) and subsequent Foreign Affair articles by Prestowitz et al. (1994) incorporating the
responses  to  Krugman, and finally  Krugman’s  responses  to  these  responses  (Krugman,
1994c). 
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After identifying Japan’s problem essentially as a micro-economic one,
Chapter 1 introduces the basic rationales regarding the need for a new
paradigm  that  will  explain  Japan’s  postwar  economic  trajectory  and
outline the implications for government policy as well as elements of a
new approach to  competition and management.  It  is  argued  that  three
warning signs, -namely, the fact that Japan is  competitive in a narrow
range of industries in world markets, Japanese corporate profit rates are
low by  international  standards,  and  Japanese  ‘domestic’  industries  are
largely  uncompetitive-  are  of  particular  importance  in  this  respect.
Statistics show that there is loss in position even in industries in which
Japan was historically  competitive (e.g. televisions).  Furthermore, there
are not many emerging industries in Japan, and the existing ones by-pass
new growth areas such as software and biotechnology, which leads  the
authors to conclude that “something has been increasingly holding back
innovation and renewal in Japan” (p.12). 
Chapter 2 proceeds to outline the well-known elements of the Japanese
government model, such as the targeting of priority industries, protection
of the home market, restricting FDI and competition, official sanctioning
of cartels, and government sponsored cooperative R&D projects. The key
question raised in this chapter is whether or not the Japanese government
model  can  discriminate  between  Japan’s  successful  and  unsuccessful
industries.  To  explore  this,  Porter  et  al.  conduct  detailed  case  study
analyses  of  twenty  competitive  and  seven  uncompetitive  Japanese
industries.2 As a result of their analysis, the authors conclude that since the
key aspects of “the government model was almost entirely absent” (p. 29)
in the broad sample of competitive industries they examined, the Japanese
government model cannot explain Japan’s competitive success. Instead,
they identify alternative, unexpected roles of the Japanese government that
contributed to the competitiveness of these industries, such as imposing
stringent  standards, which  triggered  innovation.  In  the  uncompetitive
industries,  on  the  other  hand,  the  government  model  was  prevailing,
especially in the form of intervention in competition. Although Porter  et
al.’s  aforementioned  results  challenging  the  conventional  wisdom
concerning the role of the Japanese government in these industries raise a
real question mark in one’s mind, it is debatable that case study evidence
in and of itself could suffice to reach such a strong conclusion. It is, in
other words, not easy to provide a clear-cut answer to the age-old question
regarding  the  ideal  role  that  the  government  should  assume  in  the
economic development process, which remains an unresolved issue. 
Coming down to the more micro level in Chapter 3, Porter and his
colleagues investigate the effect of Japan’s unique management model on
corporate success. Again outlining well-known concepts such as achieving
2  Summary  tables  regarding  the  role  of  government  in  competitive  and
uncompetitive Japanese industries studied are provided at the end of the chapter. 
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high  quality  with  low  cost,  lean  production,  long  term  employment,
consensus building, the keiretsu, long term perspectives of the companies,
and close ties with the government, the authors conclude that this set of
management  methods  formed  an  internally  consistent  and  coherent
system, each part dovetailing with the others and with the government.
However,  beneath  the  dazzle  of  the  high  productivity-low  cost
performance  of  the  successful  companies  were  the  low  returns  on
investment  and  the  sacrificing  of  profits  for  market  share.  With  little
pressure  from  shareholders  and  cheap  capital  available,  companies
maintained  their  unprofitable  divisions  and  continued  to  imitate  each
other’s  best  practices,  missing  chances  for  any  real  innovation.
Meanwhile,  another  form of  copying  was  going  on.  The  generic  and
widely applicable Japanese management techniques were being adopted
by U.S. companies focusing on narrower customer groups. In contrast, the
Japanese companies, in their quest to serve all types of customers, were
continuing duplicate investments, spreading themselves too thin.  
The point made in this chapter is that the Japanese companies had not
been able to find a balance between operational effectiveness (performing
the  same  or  similar  activities  better  than  competitors)  and  strategy
(competing  on  the  basis  of  a  unique  positioning  involving  a  distinct
product or service offering.) Strategy requires real innovation; an output
or a process that sets the company apart.  Establishing a strategy in this
sense  also  means  eliminating  certain  target  markets,  a  move Japanese
companies have found difficult. 
While the losses  associated (at least in the short  term) with such a
move have not been explained much in the book, Fujimoto (1999) gives a
related example for the case of the automotive industry. He describes the
problem of  “fat design” faced by Japanese automakers in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, where the product variety and model change frequency
was  deemed excessive,  in  addition to  having  too many model-specific
parts,  over-quality,  and  over-specification  of  the  products.  Many
automakers,  including Toyota, moved in the direction of  “lean product
design” in the mid-1990s as a major part of their cost reduction activities.
However,  Fujimoto  reports  cases  of  excessive  simplification  of  new
models,  resulting  in  a  loss  of  product  integrity,  lack  of  product
differentiation, and perceived deterioration of design quality, which in turn
resulted in  customer dissatisfaction and losses  of  market  share  despite
competitive prices. Thus there always seems to be a risk for companies to
be unsuccessful in this subtle balancing act and to overshoot in the wrong
direction. Porter  et  al. nonetheless  provide  examples  of  exceptions:
Honda, Sega, Nintendo, and Sony are described here as companies having
clear and unique strategies. 
The crucial difference between operational effectiveness and strategy
has been tackled by Porter previously in his  Harvard Business Review
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article “What is strategy?” (Porter, 1996). The present book follows the
argument  introduced  in  this  article:  Operational  effectiveness  is  not
strategy.  Strategy  requires  choosing  a  unique  position,  hence  making
trade-offs.  It  is  the same rationale that led Porter  to develop his  well-
known  generic  strategies:  cost  leadership versus  differentiation.  The
sources of cost advantage are, however, of crucial importance in that the
advantage  is  more  sustainable  if  it  stems  from  relatively  favourable
productivity rates, rather than easy-to-replicate labour cost advantages, for
instance. Then, it  follows that operational effectiveness  may well be  a
good base for sustainable competitive advantage, to the extent that it can
generate cost advantages based on productivity gains. In fact, the case of
Japan is an illustrative example of this, since cost advantages based on
increased  productivity  provided  Japanese  companies  with  competitive
advantages for a period long enough for Japan to improve its standard of
living considerably, even though the set of practices they introduced have
now been copied by many companies around the world.    
The core argument of the book is revealed in Chapter 4, which seeks to
understand  the  roots  of  Japanese  competitiveness.  If  it  is  not  the
conventional  explanation  which  attributes  much  of  Japan’s  success  to
government policies and management practices, then ‘what does explain
Japanese  competitiveness?’  Porter  et  al.  argue  that  the  diamond
framework,  which  is  the  product  of  Porter’s  much  celebrated  earlier
research published in The Competitive Advantage of Nations in 1990, can.
Unlike  the  conventional  explanations,  it  does  discriminate  between
Japan’s competitive and uncompetitive industries. 
The diamond framework is considered as a system of four interacting
influences  shaping  the  microeconomic  business  environment:  ‘factor
conditions’, ‘demand conditions’, ‘context for firm strategy and rivalry’
and ‘related and supporting industries’. The diamond has by now been
applied to about 40 nations and regions by project teams headed by Porter
himself, and other researchers have also conducted numerous studies on
the framework.3 Porter et al. argue that Japan is no special case and what
is  universally true about competitiveness of nations is  also observed in
Japan: “vigorous competition in a supportive business environment, free
of government direction, is the only path to economic vitality” (p. 100).
We should, however, state that the diamond framework, which provides
the basis for such conclusions, has been the subject of  much  criticism4,
especially with regard to the indirect role Porter attributes to government.
Nevertheless, by the help of the diamond framework, Porter et al. not
only provide a compelling explanation for Japan’s competitiveness, but
also highlight key problematic areas, such as the lack of specialised skills
3  See, for example, Crocombe et al. (1991), O'Donnellan (1994), Öz (1999).
4  A detailed review of this literature can be seen in Öz (1999).
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or domestic rivalry in the uncompetitive industries.5 The authors mention a
statistical  analysis  they conducted,  which provides results  that confirm
their  case  studies  and  show  that  the  intensity  of  local  rivalry  is  the
dominant factor explaining the international success of Japanese industries
(p. 112). To substantiate their results, Porter and his colleagues also refer
to  a  survey  included  in  the  Global  Competitiveness  Report,  which  is
based on the diamond theory and used as a basis for ranking the quality of
the microeconomic business environment. Accordingly, Japan’s ranking
has fluctuated between 18 and 14, which is well below its ranking in terms
of GDP per capita, “meaning that Japan’s current level of GDP per capita
is  higher  than justified by  the quality  of its  business  environment –  a
danger sign” (p. 113). It is interesting to note that, even though it had a
more optimistic outlook for Japan, the analysis of Japan in the  Nations
book (Porter, 1990) had essentially reached the same conclusions as the
present book. In the former, Japan was seen as one of the few nations that
are  in  the most  ideal  ‘innovation-driven stage’,  where  all  the  diamond
elements are at work and their functioning and interactions are at their
strongest.6 This  is  clearly  a  much  more  positive  assessment  than  the
present book, although the idea of ‘two Japans’ and a sceptical approach
toward government activism, targeting, cartels and cooperative R&D were
all there in the 1990 book as well. 
In light of their analysis in the preceding chapters, the authors focus on
the agenda for  the government in Chapter 5, which includes the relevant
implications  of  their  study  and  specific  suggestions  for  the  Japanese
government.  Accordingly,  the  Japanese  government  should
“fundamentally change its approach to competition and redefine its role in
the  economy”  (p.  160).  The  first  priority  is  to  carefully  identify  and
continue what exactly worked in the past, such as high standards in basic
education and in the areas of energy usage, safety, noise and quality. Then,
microeconomic  problems  should  be  addressed,  and  a  business
environment favourable  for  innovation and entrepreneurship  should be
created by the help of policies designed in line with the diamond approach.
Abandoning  anti-competitive  policies,  promoting  free  trade,  and
modernizing inefficient domestic sectors  are seen as inevitable steps in
this direction.   
Detailed suggestions on what companies should do in the slow growth
era are provided by the authors in Chapter 6. While noting that in response
to slow growth companies have indeed taken some steps such as reducing
product variety, downsizing, and streamlining the organizational structure,
5  At  the  end  of  Chapter  4,  the  diamond  conditions  in  the  competitive  and
uncompetitive Japanese industries studied are presented in two detailed tables.
6  Porter  (1990)  thinks  that  it  is  possible  to  classify  the  economic  development
process into four broad stages -the factor-driven, investment-driven, innovation-driven and
wealth-driven stages-, which are identified according to the prevailing sources of advantage
in the nation. 
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the  authors  discard  these  as  mere  extensions  of  the  operational
effectiveness  philosophy.  According  to  the  authors,  the  companies  are
trying  to  cure  the  symptoms,  rather  than  the  illness  itself.  What  the
Japanese companies really have to do initially is to break the taboo about
being  different,  embrace creative conflict  in  the workplace rather  than
always seeking consensus, and prioritize customer groups. They need to
loosen the links with the government and organizational clusters in order
to  allow distinct  ways  of competition to flourish.  The  “me-too” (yoko
narabi) path of benchmarking competitors results in a price competition,
does  little  to  enhance  competitiveness,  and  instead  weakens  the
manufacturers  with  respect  to  the  customers.   The  new  competition
paradigm clearly comes hand to hand with focusing more on profitability
and  return  on  investment  and  less  on  market  share  increase,  thus
eliminating  the  drive  towards  adding  capacity  and  unrelated
diversification.  
While  pointing  out  the necessity  to  adopt  elements  of  the  Western
approach, the authors claim that Japan will not and should not be a clone
of  the  U.S.  On  the  contrary,  Porter  et  al.  suggest  that  the  Japanese
maintain their strong points. For example, the Japanese have the ability to
work across functions and companies, and similarly their institutions are
able to work together. The employees are highly educated, an important
asset in the knowledge-based competition era. Likewise, the companies’
long  term  perspective  should  be  maintained  despite  emphasizing
profitability. Companies also need to utilize their experience and expand
their operational effectiveness philosophy to previously neglected areas,
such  as  white collar  productivity7 and  utilization  of  information
technology.8 
However, as mentioned earlier, Japanese management techniques are
part of a system and cannot be considered in isolation. Any change that
happens within the company needs to be reinforced with changes in the
external environment and also in other parts of the company. To give an
example, let us focus on the need to incorporate innovative thinking within
the corporation. To encourage taking risks and trying out new ideas, this
change would  most  likely  have  to  be  coupled  with  a  modification  of
employee appraisals, perhaps moving closer to merit-based systems and
away from seniority-based systems. This could bring about the question of
how a Japanese advantage mentioned earlier, namely teamwork, would be
sustained in a more individualistic corporate environment.9 Similarly, one
has  to  ask  how  mid-career  employment  could  be  made  available  for
employees who are  disgruntled (e.g.  due to differing pay scales  at the
7   c.f. also Hori (1993).
8   c.f. also Ohmae (1995).
9   This could particularly be important in the area of product development, which is
typically a cross-functional team activity in Japan.
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same seniority level or because consensus is no longer sought) or not so
innovative.10 There need to be changes in the pension systems and hiring
practices  of  organizations  in  general  for  a  smoother  transition.11
Furthermore,  in  Chapter  5  the  authors  discuss  the  weaknesses  of  the
Japanese  educational  system  by  pointing  out  the  emphasis  on
memorization,  lack  of  graduates  in  important  fields  such  as  software,
business administration, and biotechnology, the impression that time spent
in college is essentially a recuperation period after the intense preparation
for entrance, and the tight control of the government on universities.  The
companies  in  turn  have  to  rely  on  in-house  training,  which  ends  up
perpetuating the traditional corporate culture and producing generalists,
rather  than  the  creative  specialists  needed  for  generating  unique  and
ingenious  strategies.  Hence,  the  government  has  to  lead  a  reform
regarding  how  the  universities  are  governed,  how  their  curricula  are
designed,  how professors  are  evaluated,  how  professors balance  their
efforts  between  research  and  teaching,  how  closer  industry-university
links can be established, and how research is funded. 
As this example implies, any kind of new thinking a company wants to
incorporate into its system in essence needs most, if not all, elements of
Porter’s diamond to adapt simultaneously, making the process of reform
even more difficult. What is also difficult to assess is, after all this large-
scale reform to adopt a more Western style approach, if Japan will truly
not be a clone of the U.S.  For the case of Japan, the embeddedness of the
elements in Porter’s diamond makes it difficult to keep portions of it intact
while radically reforming others. Given that one thing leads to another,
seemingly moving in a spiral, Porter et al. could have perhaps emphasized
more the sequencing and timing of their suggestions, giving policymakers
a clearer idea on where to initiate the loop of events and how to deal with
the short term consequences 
Can Japan Compete? may at first seem to be a book of interest only to
people working in or on Japan. While on the whole focusing on Japan, the
insights  provided in  the  book  will  have  wide  appeal  to  any  nation’s
policymakers and businessmen who feel their industries’ performance has
not been up to par.  Sparing elaborate detail, the authors succinctly and
clearly  explain the interrelations  between the elements of the Japanese
economy, providing the reader an understanding of the intricacies unique
to Japan. A great deal of empirical effort and the investigation of a wide
array  of  data  sources  underlie  this  book,  which  add  to  its  already-
renowned  theoretical  framework.  The  result  is  an  invaluable  case
reference for teachers and developers of strategy.
10   In the past, companies would enter new businesses and send their incompetent
employees to these new subsidiaries; an option no longer valid under the reform scheme
offered by Porter and his colleagues in this book.
11   What this would imply for the concept of long-term employment is another facet
of the redesign in corporate management.
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